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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

l

CLIFFORD J. LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, I
vs.
J. RAY WARD, LEWIS SELLE-l
NEIT, dba United Auto Sales and
UNITED STATES FIDELITY &
GUARANTY COMPANY,
Civil No. 8461
Defendants and Respondents,
JOHN W. HARDMAN, et al.,
Third Party Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
1
SANDY CITY BANK,
Third Party Plaintiff and
Appellant.
1

!
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UNITED STATES FIDELITY
& GUARANTY COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company agrees generally with the Statement of Facts
contained in Appellant's Brief, but desires to add the
following facts.
For convenience the Respondent will hereafter be
referred to as U.S.F. & G. Co.
Following the cmnmencement of the original action
1
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by Clifford J. Lawrence, this Respondent filed its Complaint in Interpleader bringing into Court the Third
Party Defendants. This Respondent's maximum potential liability on its bonds was $1,000.00 on the bond of
Selleneit and $5,000.00 on the bond of Ward. It acknowledged .a possible liability under the bonds and asked
the Court to determine its liability to the Plaintiff and to
each of the Third Party Defendants. (R. 16 to 18)
The judgment of the Trial Court was in favor of
the Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants against Ward
and Selleneit for a total of $10,553.00. \Vith the exception of Third Party Defendants, Bellows, Lyon and
Dalton, judgments w~re against both Ward and Selleneit jointly and severally. The judgments for Bellows
for $322.50, for Lyon for $1,070.00 and for Dalton for
$107.00 were not against Selleneit. All judgments, except Sandy City Bank for $5,849.01 were also against
the U.S.F. & G. Co. (R.174 to 177).
If the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed there
is enough bond money to pay in full all the judgments
against the U.S.F. & G. Co. These judgments were for
$4,683.89 and the bonds totaled $6,000.00.
After the trial and judgment of the Court and on
October 31, 1955 the amount of the judgment against
the U.S.F. & G. Co., the sun1 of $4,683.89, was by the
U.S.F. & G. Co. deposited with the Clerk of the Court
to satisfy said judgmen.t (R. 179).
If Sandy City Bank is to share in the bond money
2
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there will be total claims against the bonds of $10,553.00
and the amount of the bonds, $6,000.00, will pay approximately 57% to each of the claimants. Therefore,
if Sandy City Bank succeeds in its attempt on this Appeal to share in the bond money, the amount of recovery
for each of the other parties from the bond money will
be reduced by 43%. The additional potential liability of
the U.S.F. & G. Co. is $1,316.11. The potential loss to
the Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants, except Sandy
City Bank, is 43o/o of $4,683.89, or $2,014.27, unless the
judgments against Ward and Selleneit can be collected.
The pleadings in the case are voluminous (R. 1 to
189). The transcript of the testimony of the witnesses
covers pages 193 to 396 of the Record. A Pre-Trial
was conducted and a Pre-Trial Order signed by the Trial
Judge (R. 140 to 145). The claims of Sandy City Bank
are set out in the Pre-Trial Order (R. 142 and 143).
STATElVfENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE MORTGAGE OF THE CADILLAC TO SANDY
CITY BANK BY WARD WAS NOT SUCH A TRANSACTION AS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE USED
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND OF WARD
OR THE MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND OF
SELLENEIT FURNISHED BY THE U.S.F. & G. CO.
POINT II
THE USED MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND AND
MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND DO NOT PROTECT SANDY CITY BANK AGAINST LOSS BY
REASON OF THE NON-ENDORSEMENT OF THE
HARDY CHECK OR THE FORGERY OF THE DALTON
CHECK, BOTH o:F' WHICH WERE ISSUED BY
WINDER INSURANCE AGENCY.
3
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POINT III
THE LOSS SUFFERRED BY SANDY CITY BANK WAS
THE RESULT OF ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS
TO BAR RECOVERY FROM U.S.F. & G. CO.
ON THE BONDS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MORTGAGE OF THE CADILLAC TO SANDY
CITY BANK BY WARD WAS NOT SUCH A TRANSACTION AS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE USED
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND OF WARD
OR THE MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND OF
SELLENEIT FURNISHED BY THE U.S.F. & G. CO.

The argument under this Point is in answer to the
argument of Appellant under Points I, II and ill of
Appellant's Brief.
The Cadillac in question was one owned by J. Ray
'Vard, or as Appellant interprets the situation, one sold
by United Auto Sales, which was in fact J. Ray Ward,
to J. Ray Ward, the sale of which was financed through
Winder Insurance Agency by loan and mortgage with
Sandy City Bank. It w.as a new 1954 Inodel (Ex. 26-D,
R. 296 and 7). ":--ard gave his note for $2,962.08 payable
to the Rand~· City Bank at the rate of $1:23.4:2 per month
(Ex. 25-D, R. 296 and 8). ~\ chattel1nortgage was given
to SandY CitY Bank to secure the paJinent of the note
.at tiH' rate of $123.4:2 per nwnth, which was executed by
.J. H.ay 'rani (Ex. :.2()-D, R. :29G). ~-\..check for $2,500.00
wa~ writtPn hy \Yinder Insurance Agency payable to
.J. Hn~· \Yanl and United Auto Sales to pay the proceeds
4
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obtained in exchange for the note and rnortgage (Ex.
24-D, R. 296 and 8).
This Respondent contends that this type of transaction is not covered by the bond. At most it was a sal':>
bv a licensed and bonded used motor vehicle dealer to
himself with the financing of this sale being made by the
Sandy City Bank through Winder Insurance Agency.
The motor vehicle was a new vehicle, not a used one.
The transaction, as far as the bonded used motor vehicle
dealer was concerned was one to obtain finances for the
operation of his business. Unlike the other transactions
J. Ray Ward, the purchaser, was not defrauded because
of a sale of an automobile by United Auto Sales to him.
A person cannot defraud himself.
Respondent submits that a reasonable interpretation
of the Used Motor Vehicle Act is that said Act was
designed to protect those who purchase used cars from
a used motor vehicle dealer. There is nothing in the Act
which expressly gives protection to banks or other
financial institutions who desire for a profit to finance
the business of the used motor vehicle dealer. Banks and
other financial institutions trained and experienced as
they are in financial matters should not need the protection of the Act as do prospective buyers of vehicles. The
bonds required are small in amount, $5,000.00 for dealers
and $1,000.00 for salesrnen. To extend the protection of
the bonds to include protection for those who finance
the sale of automobiles, or who finance the operations
of the business of a used motor vehicle dealer, is to reduce the protection afforded to those who suffer loss by
5
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reason of being defrauded when they purchase used
vehicles fron1 licensed and bonded used motor vehicle
dealers and salesmen.
Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in referring to the bond to be filed by the dealer provided
that the bond shall be:
"conditioned that the said applicant shall conduct his business as a dealer without fraud or
fraudulent representation and without the violation of any of the provisions of this act."
What is meant by the words "conduct his business as
a dealer~" The necessary part of business of a dealer
is the purchase of used motor vehicles and the sale thereof to the public. The borrowing of money to carry on
the business or the financing of a sale of an automobile
to the dealer himself is not, in the opinion of Respondent,
conducting his business. These are incidental to the
business, similar to the making and filing of reports and
returns for the business and the payment of taxes on
the business. Certainly the filing of a false return and
underpayment of money on ·a Utah State Sales tax
return, Federal tax return, or Withholding tax and Social
Security tax are not covered by the bond. It .appears to
Respondent that this transaction with the Sandy City
Bank through the '\Yinder Insurance Agency is not one
covered by the bond and that the Trial Court correctly
found that this loan was not by J. Ra~T '\Yard made in
the course of his business as a used car dealer (R. 16±,
Par. 43).
6
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POINT II
THE USED MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND AND
MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND DO NOT PROTECT SANDY CITY BANK AGAINST LOSS BY
REASON OF THE NON-ENDORSEMENT OF THE
HARDY CHECK OR THE FORGERY OF THE DALTON
CHECK, BOTH OF WHICH WERE ISSUED BY
WINDER INSURANCE AGENCY.

The argument under this Point is in answer to
Points IV, V, VI and VII of Appellant's Brief.
The loss suffered by Sandy City Bank occurred only
after that bank, upon which the checks were drawn
against the account of Winder Insurance Agency, cashed
the checks made payable in the one instance to Hardy
and United Auto Sales and in the other instance to
Dalton and United Auto Sales. The Hardy check had
no endorsement as far as the payee Hardy was concerned. The Dalton check bore an endorsement which
Dalton contended was a forgery. The American Surety
Company insured Sandy City Bank against loss by
forgery and reimbursed Sandy City Bank for its loss on
this check.
The loss on these two checks .arose not out of the
business of a sale of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles
by the used motor vehicle dealer or his salesman, but
because the bank cashed the checks without an endorsement in the one instance and with a forged endorsement
in the other instance.
Respondent has been unable to find any case which
has construed or interpreted Section 41-3-16, U.C.A.,
7
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1953 or similar acts of other states in regards to who are
protected under the bond furnished by a motor vehicle
dealer as required by such a statute.
A case decided by the Supreme Court of Idaho in
1933 interpreted the Idaho statute requiring a farm
produce broker to furnish a bond and this case might be
of some assistance in arriving at a decision in this case.
The case is that of Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Company, 53 Idaho 228, 22 P. 2d 1066.
The Sections of the Idaho Statutes considered and
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Idaho were:
"Section 22-1005. 'No person shall act as
farm produce broker, farm produce dealer, or
farm produce commission merchant within the
meaning of this act without first having obtained
a license and given a bond as hereinafter described. Such license shall expire on June 1st of
each year and must be renewed yearly.'
Section 22-1006. 'Any person desiring to act
as a farm produce broker, f.arm produce dealer,
or farm produce commission merchant within the
meaning of this act in the state of Idaho, shall
make written application for a license therefor
to the commissioner of agriculture, stating the
name and residence of the applicant, his principal office or place of business in this state, name
of the person or persons in charge of his office
or business in this state, the names and addresses
of five persons residents of this state, of whom
inquiry can be made as to the character, standing
.and reputation of the applicant; if the applicant
is a corporation, the nan1es and addresses of its
officers and directors; if a co-partnership, the
8
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names and addresses of the partners. All applications for licenses hereunder shall be filed with
the commissioner of agriculture and shall be .accompanied by a good and sufficient bond in the
penal sum of not less than $2500 and upon a form
to be approved by the attorney-general of the
state of Idaho, and shall be executed by the applicant as principal and by a surety company
authorized to do business in the state of Idaho
as surety. Said bond shall be for the benefit of
any and all consignors having any cause of action
against the broker, dealer or commission Inerchant, giving such bond and .arising out of a
breach of contract either expressed or implied
of such broker, dealer or commission merchant
with a consignor or with consignors as broker,
dealer, commission merchant and consignor or
consignors or for any fraud practiced by such
broker, dealer or commission merchant for the
violation of the rights of any consignor or consignors, and shall be conditioned for the faithful
perforinance by the applicant of all duties as
such broker, dealer or commission merchant, and
shall be for the full period of the time covered
by such license. * * * '
Section 22-1008. 'The bond herein required
to be given shall be conditioned that said applicant will conduct and transact his business
honestly and without fr.aud of any kind or nature
and will comply with the provisions of this act
and all the laws of the state of Idaho. Any person injured by dishonesty, fraud or violation of
the provisions of this act or of the laws of the
state of Idaho, committed by any person licensed
under the provisions of this act and while engaged
in such business shall have a right of action on
such bond for his damages not exceeding the
amount of the bond."
9
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Lebrecht purchased potatoes from the licensed
broker and paid therefor, but the potatoes were not
delivered nor was the amount p.aid for them returned to
the purchaser.
The Idaho Court construed the statutes and held
that the purchaser was a consignee and that the statutes
were for the protection only of the consignor as defined
in the act.
The Court said:
"A consignor, as defined, parts with his produce in large quantities, by selling and delivering
the same to the broker, dealer, or merchant without getting his pay for the same, who, in turn
disposes of the produce and invariably receives
his money. Without the security furnished under
the act, the consignor would have to rely entirely
upon the fin~:ncial standing, honesty, and integrity of the broker, dealer, or merchant, that he
will be honestly dealt with. Sharp practices and
financial instability were often times found to
exist, causing the consignor to suffer loss, which,
undoubtedly, prompted the passage of the act.
Other people deal with the broker on an altogether different basis and are in a much better
position to protect themselves. These are reasons
why protection should he, and is, afforded to the
consignor, and not to others. This being a statutory bond, its terms will be construed under the
statute to afford protection to the consignor only.
In construing a statute, it is the duty of the court
to consider the reason for the law, its object, and
purpo~r. so as to ascertain and render effective
the legislative Intent."
10
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It appears to Respondent that the purpose of the
Utah statute is to protect purchasers of used cars from
the dealers and not to protect banks and finance companies who are in better position to protect themselves.
POINT III
THE LOSS SUFFERRED BY SANDY CITY BANK WAS
THE RESULT OF ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS
TO BAR RECOVERY FROM U.S.F. & G. CO.
ON THE BONDS.

This Point applies to all three transactions in which
Sandy City Bank suffered losses.
On the Ward Cadillac transaction no proof of ownership or indicia of title was required before a loan of
$2,500.00 was made thereon. Reliance was placed only
on the fact that dealings were had with a licensed dealer
(R. 302 and 313).
Mr. Fotheringham of Winder Insurance Agency
acted as agent for the bank in handling the transaction.
He took mortgages and notes and delivered checks without requiring any title certificates to be delivered because
he knew none were available (R. 302). If title certificates
were not available checks for loans could have been held
by Sandy City Bank or Winder Insurance Agency until
title certificates were obtained and after the title certificates had been delivered the checks could then have
been delivered had the bank desired to protect itself.
At the time the Dalton check (Ex. 12-D) was presented to Sandy City Bank for payment, the bank had
11
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in its possession a chattel mortgage and a promissory
note, both of which had been signed by Mr. Dalton (R.
12). No comparison of the purported signature of Dalton
on the check was made with his known signature on the
chattel mortgage and promissory note (R.13). The check
was cashed without taking any steps to secure the title
certificate to the car involved.
The Hardy check (Ex. 21-D) was cashed without the
endorsement of Hardy (R. 310). If the bank had used
the simple precaution of requiring the endorsement of
a payee before cashing this check it would have suffered
no loss. This check was also cashed without taking any
steps to secure the title certificate to the car involved.
The essential elements for recovery for fraud are:
"The essential elements required to sustain
an action for deceit are, generally speaking, that
a representation was 1nade as a statement of fact,
which was untrue and known to be untrue by the
party making it, or else recklessly made; that
it was made with intent to deceive and for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon
it; and that he did in fact rely on it and was induced thereby to act to his injury or damage."
23 Am. J ur. 773.
In considering whether or not there has been a
reliance by the person \Yho rlaims to have been defrauded, one 1nust consider the duty on the part of the person to whom the representation has been made to use
some 1neasures of protection and precaution to safe12
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guard his interest, as appears from the following statement:
"The authorities are well agreed that the
principle of right of reliance is closely bound up
with a duty on the part of a representee to use
some measure of protection and precaution to
safeguard his interest. It is well settled, as a
broad generalization, that a person to whom false
representations have been made is not entitled
to-relief because of them if he might readily have
.ascertained the truth by ordinary care and attention, and his failure to do so was the result of
his own negligence. Although the authorities are
in accord on the abstract proposition that there
is no right of reliance if the conduct of the representee constitutes negligence in the premises,
under the circu1nstances of the case, the nature
of the transaction and representations, and the
situation of the parties, the authorities are not
in perfect accord as to the standard by which the
conduct of the representee is to be judged. According to some courts, the test is objective. It
has frequently been stated that in order that false
representations be a ground for an action of
deceit, or for recission of a contract entered into
in reliance thereon, they must be such as are
calculated to impose upon or deceive a person of
ordinary prudence, and of such a character that
a reasonably prudent person would rely on them.
According to other courts, the standard for measuring the conduct of the representee is subjective, based not on what the ordinary man would
do under the circumstances, but on what the
particular representee should have done. Under
this view, the test for determining whether one
party to a transaction has a right to rely on
representations of the other is not whether a
reasonable man would be justified in relying on
13
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such representations, but whether they were of
such a nature and made in such circumstances
that the complaining party had a right to rely
thereon. A rule which has been approved, and
which combines those elements of both the objective and subjective tests which have been stated
by the courts enunciating them to be desirable,
is that in measuring the right to rely upon representations, every person must use reasonable
diligence for his own protection. Under any
standard of conduct, and in the absence of accompanying actual deception, artifice, or misconduct, it is well agreed that where the means of
knowledge are at hand and are equally available
to both parties, and the subject matter is equally
open to their inspection, if one of them does not
avail himself of those means and opportunities, he
will not be heard to say that he was deceived by
the other's misrepresentations. The reasons and
justification for this rule have been variously
stated, as that it is public policy; that it is an
offshoot of the rule of caveat emptor; that in the
circumstances envisaged by the rule, any consequential loss is attributable to the representee's
carelessness and neglect of his own interest rather
than to the false representations, and that, therefore, the maxin1 ''volenti non fit injuria" is applicable." 23 Am. Jur. 960,
The action and conduct of the Sandy City Bank in
its dealings with Ward and Selleneit were, in the opinion
of Respondent, very negligent and careless and were not
the actions and conduct of a careful bank. Under these
circumstances Respondent sub1nits that Sandy City Bank
should not be entitled to recover against Respondent
14
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because of the loss occasioned by its own carelessness
and negligence.
The judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GROTH, GRAWFORD & NELSON and
ELLIOTT W. EVANS
By
ELLIOTT W. EVANS
Attorneys for Respondent,
United States Fidelity ~
Guaranty Company
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